Federal Power Producers

Goals of Restructuring
• Lower retail prices through competition in wholesale electricity production -Existing Firms--PG&E, SCE, and SDG&E -New Firms--Duke, AES/Williams, Dynegy, Reliant, Mirant -Existing Govt Entities--BPA, WAPA, LADWP, CADWR
• Transmission and distribution remain regulated monopoly services Methodology for computing benchmark price controls for unit outages, import response due to to lower instate prices, and capacity held out of energy market to provide ancillary services Supply Side Complications
• Account for forced outages by probabilistic simulation of forced outages at all plants.
-Forced outage rates for each technology from NERC -For each realization from joint (over all plants) forced outage distribution, compute marginal cost of supplying market for that hour -Average these realized marginal costs over a large number of draws from the forced outage distribution to get the expected marginal cost for that hour
• Start-Up costs and other non-convexities in production are not included in the estimation.
Supply Side Complications
• Account for daily fluctuations in prices of natural gas and other fossil fuels in California • Extremely important to analysis for Autumn and Winter of 2000 -Natural gas prices where more than four times higher than in two previous years
• Account for fluctuations in daily costs of NOx emissions permits to produce electricity for units in emissions-constrained areas -Primarily LA Basin--Could add more $50/MWh to variable cost of production for some units
Complications in Estimation:
Demand Side
• Reserve Capacity that is put into the normal dispatch is part of the industry energy cost function only when it gets used, so we include all actual power generated.
-Unused reserve capacity is extramarginal and should not affect the energy price.
• Regulation Upwards is held out of the stack so must be treated separately. We add "Reg Up" to the demand.
For various sets of days, D, and sets of hours ,H, compute In-state fossil-fuel production in 2000 significantly greater than instate fossil-fuel production in 1999 4) Myth--California's demand grew much faster than rest of west Reality--Growth in population over decade of 1990's much higher in surrounding states NV-50%, AZ-30%, UT-24%, CO-23%, ID-24%,WA-18% CA-13% 5) Myth--California's didn't re-structure enough Reality--Measured by any metric California re-structured more than any market in US • Different from all other re-structuring processing around the world and in US -California did not assign vesting contracts to units sold
• Vesting contract is an obligation to sell a significant fraction of a unit's output at regulated price for at least two years -For a 500 MW unit, typical vesting contract would require selling 400 MW every hour for two years for a pre-specified price or pattern of price Regulatory Factors Causing to Current Problems at Federal Level
• FERC regulates wholesale electricity rates -Federal Power Act requires FERC to
• Ensure the wholesale rates are just and reasonable • If they are not, take action to make them just and reasonable -"Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had up its own motion or upon complaint, shall find that any rate, charge, or classification, demand, observed, charged or collected by any public utility for transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affected such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification rule, rule, regulation, practice or contract to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order." (Federal Power Act)
• Order refunds for rates in excess of just and reasonable levels
• Just and reasonable rates recover production costs, including a return to capital
Regulatory Factors Causing to Current Problems at Federal Level
• How does FERC introduce wholesale competition?
-Competitive market yields prices reflective of production costs
• Monopoly or oligopoly market need not set cost-reflective prices -If market participant can demonstrate that it cannot influence market price (cannot exercise market power)
• FERC will deem participant eligible to receive market-based rates • All firms start out with cost-based rates set by FERC -All California market participants had to make marketbased rate filing approved by FERC
• Demonstrate that they have no ability to exercise market power • FERC makes determination of validity of this claim • Extremely difficult to determine if market is competitive on ex ante basis
